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IX.
Customs, when so general in character as to be universally
known, will receive judicial notice.
Of these may be noted,-That the running, directing and
management of trains are generally controlled by the owners
of a railroad: South. & North. Ala. R. R. Co. v. Pilgreen (1878),
62 Ala. 305 ; Evansville, &c., R. R. Co. v. SMith (1878), 65 Ind.
92. That mercantile agencies collect and distribute informa-
tion as to the financial condition of persons in business:
Holmesv.Harrington (i886), 2o Mo. App.66i. That Sundays
and great festivals, such as Christmas, are dies non in law; and
the commercial usage to observe them; so that, if a not.falls
due on one of them, it should be presented for payment or
protest on the day previous thereto : Sasscer v. Farmer's Bank
(1853), 4 Md. 4o9. The custom of the road, in passing to the
right or left: Tm-ley v. Thomas (1837), 8 C. & P. 103.
The customs of the sea, to be observed by vessels, when such
customs are general and notorious: The Scotia (187 I), 14 Wall.
(81 U. S.) 17o. The initials C. 0. D., affixed to packages sent
by common carriers, may be taken notice of, as meaning to
collect the price of the goods and charges for carrying them,
on delivery: State v. Intoxicating Liquors (1882), 73 Me. 278;
compare McNichol v. Pacific Er. Co. (1882), 12 Mo. App. 4o.
Established weights and measures: Mays v.Jennings (1843), 4
Humph. (Tenn.) lO2.
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X.
As a general rule, customs local in their character, will not
be judicially noticed. Of these may be mentioned,-The cus-
toms of mining camps for the use of water for mining purposes,
under the provisions of the United States statute giving pre-
ference to prior occupants: Lewis v. MvIcClure (i88O), 8 Or.
273. The usages and customs of a particular denomination of
Christians, as the Methodist Episcopal Church: Youngs v.
Ransom (I 859), 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 49. Where a white man mar-
ried a Choctaw woman and took up his abode with that nation,
whether or not he would, by law, be the head of a family, was
held to depend upon the local customs of thie tribe, and could
not be judicially noticed: Turner v. Fish (1854), 28 Miss. 3o6.
So of local customs for the use of water for irrigation:
Sullivan v. Hense (1874), 2 Colo. 424. The rules of a board
of brokers, where they do not constitute a usage of trade,
independent of the action of the board in adopting them, will
not receive notice: Goldsmithi v. Sawyer (1873), 46 Cal. 209;
Sarahass v. Armstrong (1876). 16 Kan. 192. It has been held,
that a usage of merchants, by which they sold goods to each
other's clerks and customers and charged the same, on credit,
to the firm, would be judicially noticed as an established cus-
tom: Cameron v. Blackman (I878), 39 Mich. io8.
XI.
Unless specially required by law, courts will not take judi-
cial notice of private or special statutes: Workingmen's Bank
v. Converse (I88 I), 33 La. An. 963. In Kentucky, where, by
statute, they are not required to be pleaded, private and special
acts receive judicial notice: Halbert v. Skyles (1818), I A. K.
Marsh. (Ky.) 368; Collier v. Baptist Ed. Soc. (1847-8), 8 B.
Mon. (Ky.) 68. Under like circumstances, the same rule pre-
vails in Virginia: Somerville v. Wimbish (1850), 7 Grat. (Va.)
205. In Alabama, where a similar provision exists, the courts
have refused to notice a private act for the purpose of deter-
mining the sufficiency of a demurrer to the complaint, referring
to the act by date and title only: Broad Street Hotel Co. v.
Weaver's Adm'rs (1876), 57 Ala. 26.
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XII.
Courts of general jurisdiction do not judicially notice mu-
nicipal ordinances: Garvin v. lVdls (1859), 8 Iowa 286. They
will take such notice of the charter, and the power under it, to
make by-laws, but not of those laws themselves: Case v.
Mayor of Mlobile (1857), 30 Ala. 538. Where the charter pro-
vides that the printed ordinances shall be received in evidence
in all courts and places, they will not be judicially noticed, un-
less so introduced to the knowledge of the court: Cox v. City
of St. Louis (1848), I Mo. 431. In all cases they are re-
quired to be pleaded in whole or in substance: Mffooney v. Ken-
nctt (1854), 19 Mo. 551 ; State ex rel Oddle v. Sherman (1868),
42 Id. 214; Lucker v. Commonwcalth (1868), 4 Bush (Ky.),
44o. The ordinances of a municipality will be judicially no-
ticed by its own courts; and where a conviction for a viola-
tion of an ordinance is had, and an appeal taken, the district
court should take judicial notice of the ordinance. But it is
not error to admit it in evidence, over the objection of the de-
fendant: Downing v. City of AMiltonvale (1887), 36 Kan. 740.
XIII.
Courts take judicial notice of the prominent geographical
facts and features of the country; as its large lakes, rivers and
mountains: Afossman v. Forrest (1866). 27 Ind. 233 ; WinniPi-
seogee Lake Co. v. Young (86o), 40 N. H. 42o. The Supreme
Court of Indiana takes notice of the falls in the Ohio river,
and that no pilots are appointed for any other falls in the State:
Cash v. Auditor of Clark County (1855), 7 Ind. 227. Notice
will be taken that the State of Missouri is east of the Rocky
Mountains: Price v. P-age (I856), 24 Mo. 65. Courts will know
that there are no tidal streams in an inland county: Walker v.
Allen (1882), 72 Ala. 456. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
takes notice that the capacity of many small navigable streams
in the State has been increased for lumbering purposes by a
system of dams to retain and discharge the water: Tewksbury
v. Schulenberg (1877), 41 Wis. 584.
In admiralty it has been held that the court would take ju-
dicial notice of the situation of a town upon a river, in a for-
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eign country, and that a bar exists at its mouth, over which
vessels of the draft of the one in suit cannot pass: The Peter-
off (1863), Bl. Pr. Cas. (U. S. D. Ct.) 463.
XIV.
Courts will take judicial notice of the boundaries of a State;
and of the extent of its territorial jurisdiction; and also of its
civil divisions, created by public laws, such as counties and
towns: Goodwin v. Appleton (1843), 22 Me. 453 ; Gilbert v.
Moline WaterPower Co. (1865), 19 Iowa, 319. Where a ques-
tion of title had been tried, regardless of the fact that the land
in controversy was within an Indian reservation, the court, on
the ground of public policy, took judicial notice of this fact,
and held that there was a mistrial, notwithstanding a stipula-
tion of the parties: French v. Lancaster (I88O), 2 Dak. 346.
Where the declaration, in an action for personal injuries
against a railroad company, alleged that the injury occurred
in the county where the suit was brought, and the proof
showed it to have been on the line between two post-offices in
the county, the court took judicial notice that the locality
shown was within the county: CentralR. R. &c. Co. v. Gain-
ble (1886), 77 Ga. 584. That lands are within a certain county
will be noticed from the numbers of the township and range
appearing in their description: Fogg v. Holcomb (1884), 64
Iowa 621. The court will judicially know that a certain judi-
cial district is within and for a certain county, although it com-
prises only a portion of the territory of that county: People v.
Robinson (I86I), 17 Cal. 363. The Supreme Court of Alabama
took judicial notice that all lands for sale in the district of
Cahaba are within the State; and that a description of lands
in a petition stating the section, town and range in said dis-
trict was sufficient: King v. Kent (1857), 29 Ala. 542. In a
suit against a railroad company for personal damages the proof
was that the accident occurred at a certain locality, without
showing the same to be within the county; the court took
judicial notice of the county boundaries and that the place
designated was within their limits, and the proof was held
sufficient: Indianapolis, &c., R. R. Co. v. Case (I86o), 15 Ind.
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42. The Supreme Court of the United States takes judicial
notice that, for internal revenue purposes, the United States is
by law divided into collection districts, with defined geograph-
ical boundaries: U. S. v.Jackson (1881), 104 U.S. 41.
The Supreme Court of California has taken judicial notice
of the relation of the streets in San Francisco to one another
and of the direction in which they run: Bradyv. Page (I88 I),
59 Cal. 52. And so, in Texas, that a townis situated in a
county of which it is the county seat : Carsonv. Dalton (1883),
59 Tex. 500.
Xv.
Courts will take judicial notice of the Government surveys
and legal subdivisions of the public lands: Atzvaterv. Schenck
(1859), 9 Wis. i6o; Hill v. Bacon (1867), 43 Ill. 477; Prieger
v. Erchange, &c., hs. CO. (1857), 6 Wis. 89. And of other
public surveys made by the Government: Vright v. Pillips
(1849), 2 G. Gr. (Iowa) 191. The courts of Illinois take
notice of the meaning of initials used in the description of
land in conveyances, levies of executions, judicial sales, sur-
veys, assessments for taxes, &c., without further proof; where,
in the description of land, the number of a township is given,
without indicating whether north or south, in the county where
the land is described as being, the court will take judicial no-
tice of the fact that the township referred to is north; and that
the south line of the section and the south line of the town-
.ship are one and the same: Kile v. Town of Yelowhead(187 5),
8o Ill. 2o8. Surveys of blocks and lots in towns and cities
will also be noticed: Gardner v. Eberhart (1876), 82 Ill. 316.
'That the State of Oregon is a Congressional and judicial dis-
trict of the United States: U. S. v. Johnson (1873), 2 Saw.
(U. S. C. Ct., D. Or.) 482. Of the area of any established
-county in the State: Board of Com'rs v. Spitler (1859), 13 Ind.
235; Buckinghouse v. Gregg (1862), 19 Id. 4o; Wright v.
Hawlkins, 28 Tex. 452. Also, of where the lines of counties
run and the towns embraced therein; Ham v. Ham (1855), 39
-Me. 263; Brown v. Elms (1849), io Humph. (Tenn.), 135.
Courts will take judicial notice of the intended area of a
-government quarter section of land, and where it was claimed
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that a fractional quarter contained a larger area it was held
that proof must be made that the lines were so run on the
ground as to include the increased area: Quinn v. Windmiller
(1885), 67 Cal. 461. In North Carolina the Supreme Court
will take judicial notice of the judicial districts of the State,
and what counties each embraces, and, where the judges ofthe
Superior Courts are, in the course of their ridings and in the
discharge of their official duties: State v. Ray (1887), 97
N. C. 510.
XVl.
Judicial notice will be taken of the distance between well-
known cities of the United States and the ordinary speed of
railway trains between the same: Pcarce v. Langflt (1882),
ioi Pa. 507; Rice v.'Mongomery (1866), 4 Biss (U.S.C. Ct.,
D. Ind.) 75.
Where a territorial statute provided that acts should take
effect at the seat of government on their passage, and allowing
one day for each fifteen miles distant therefrom, on the ques-
tion as to whether a certain act was in force at a given locality
on a particular day, the court took judicial notice of the dis-
tance of the place named from the seat of government: Hoyt
v. Russell (I885), 117 U. S. 401.
Judicial notice will be taken of the geographical positions
of the towns in a county: Indianapolis, &c., R. R. Co. v. Ste-
phens (1867), 28 Ind. 429; State v. Tootle (1837), 2 Harr. (Del.)
541. And of the county in which a town created by law is
situated: Martin v. Martin (1863), 51 Me. 366; Vanderwerker
v. People (1830), 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 53o . That the State and the
government township are two distinct organizations: La Grange
v. Chapman (1863), II Mich. 499. Of the fact that there is
but one township of a given description in a county of the
State: Stoddaid v. Sloan (885), 65 Iowa 68o. And of the
fact that Galveston is in a county of the same name: Solyer v.
Romanet (1880), 52 Tex. 562.
XVII.
Courts are bound to take judicial notice of public history
affecting the whole people: Payne v. Treadwell (I86o), 16 CaL
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220. That slavery was destroyed by act of war, prior to the
passage of the State ordinance to that effect, approved on the
22nd day of September, 1865, is judicially noticed by the Su-
preme Court of Alabama: Ferdinand v. State (1866), 39 Ala.
7o6. The separation of the Methodist Episcopal Church in
1844 into two Methodist Episcopal Churches, the one north
and the other south of a common boundary line, was an event
that connected itself with and formed a part of the history
of the country, of which judicial notice will be taken: Hum-
phreyv. Burnside (1868), 4 Bush (Ky.) 215. Courts will take
judicial cognizance that the civil war was terminated prior to
June ist, 1865 ; and, in Alabama, it will be judicially noticed
that the United States mails were established between Hunts-
ville and New Orleans prior to December 18, 1865: Turner v.
Patton (1873), 49 Ala. 4o6.
XVIII.
The court will take judicial notice that certain portions of a
State in insurrection were under the control of the forces of
the United States, but will not infer therefrom that individuals
resided there or in the territory over which the government
had re-established its authority as against the averments of a
plea that they were public enemies: Ricey. Shook (1871), 27
Ark. 137. The courts of Tennessee will take notice of when the
courts in a particular county were closed, civil law suspended
and military law prevailing, in the civil war: Killebrew v.
Murphy (187I), 3 Heisk. (Tenn) 546. The courts of Texas
take notice that in 1869 the government of that State was ad-
ministered by military authority, under the reconstruction acts
of Congress; and that the orders of the commander of the
5th military district had the force of law: Gates v. Johnson
County (1871-2), 36 Tex. 144. The courts take notice that
the Confederate currency was imposed only by force, and that
its dollars were of different value from those of the United
States: Keppel v. Petersburg R. R. Co. (1868), Chase (U. S.
C. Ct., D. Va.) 167. The Alabama -courts take cognizance
of the fact, as a matter of the history of the times, that the
people of that State, in 1867, were in a condition of very
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great pecuniary depression, as affecting the duties of a guar-
dian, at that time, in making investment of trust funds: As/dey
v. Martin (1874), 50 Ala. 537. The result of an election for
the removal of a county seat, when the matter is drawn in
issue collaterally, will be judicially noticed: Andrews v. Knox
County (1873), 7o Ill. 65. The courts will take notice of the
different classes of notes and bills in circulation as money at a
particular time: Hart v. State (1877), 55 Ind. 59I. The gen-
eral facts connected with the issuing, use, and depreciation of
the Confederate currency, will be taken notice of as matters of
general history: Simmons v. Trumbo (1876), 9 W. Va. 358.
The courts of the State will know who is the Executive, at any
time when the fact may be called in question: Deweese v.
Colorado County (1870), 32 Tex. 570. And that gold coin in
1868 did not circulate as money: U S. v. American Gold Coin
(1868), i Wool. (U. S. C. Ct, D. Mo.) 217. The Alabama
courts will notice that, as a general thing, contracts made in
that State, in 1865, were made with reference to Confederate
currency: Buford v. Tucker (I87o), 44 Ala. 89. The courts of
Indiana are bound to notice that, during and since the civil
war, the Adjutant-General of that State has made muster rolls
of her regiments in the service, and that a certified copy of the
same is sufficient evidence to prove the enlistment, etc., of a
party as a volunteer, in an action by him to recover bounty;
and that the certificate is sufficient, if made by the present in-
cumbent of the office: Monroe County Com'rs v. May (1879),
67 Ind. 562. Transactions and objects which necessarily con-
nect themselves with the history of a country will be judi-
cially noticed: Hart v. Bodley (1807), Hardin (Ky.) 5 16.
The fact that the United States was the proprietor of, and
made a grant of land to the State of Illinois, and the location
of such land, is judicially noticed by the courts of the State:
Smith v. Stevens (1876), 82 Ill. 554. Fremont's public career
in California, in 1846 and 1847, is taken notice of as a matter
of history, affecting the people and the government; an inter-
esting sketch of which, showing its legal aspects, is given in
the text of the following decision: De Celis v. United States
(1877), 13 Ct. Cl. (U. S.) 117. Courts will notice such a
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public event as Sherman's march to the sea: Williams v. State
(1881), 67 Ga. 260. And the results ofa taking of the census:
People v. Williams (1883), 64 Cal. 87. The courts of Ten-
nessee take judicial notice of the suspension of the statute of
limitations in that State, from May 6th, 1861, to January ist,
1867: East Tenn. fron M41anuPng Co. v. Gaskell (1879), 2 Lea.
(Tenn.) 742.
XIX.
Courts will take judicial notice of the history of their State,
and its topography and condition: IVllians v. State (1878),
64 Ind. 553. The Supreme Court of Alabama takes judicial
notice, as a matter of history in the State, that the evil sought
to be remedied by a certain law was to prevent County Treas-
urers from speculating in State warrants; and that the consti-
tutional provision, "No money shall be drawn from the
treasury but in pursuance of an appropriation made by law,"
was to prevent the executive power from controlling the public
moneys and not to restrict the legislative power: Smith v. Speed
(1874), 5o Ala. 276.
The claim of Virginia, before the year 1783, to the North-
west Territory; her cession of it, in that year, to the United
States, reserving a tract of land granted by her to the soldiers
of the Illinois regiment, and her statutes for the final disposal
of the soil of this reservation, now known as the " Illinois
Grant," are taken notice of by the courts of Indiana, as part
of the history of the State: Henthonz v. Doe on dem. of Shipherd
(1822), I Blackf. (Ind.) 159. The history of a county, as to
the times of holding courts and as to"the seat of justice, will
be noticed: Ross v. Austill (1852), 2 Cal. 183. The courts of
Alabama take notice that all the lands in a certain county in
the State are held under title from the United States: Lewis v.
Hartis (1858), 31 Ala. 689. In order to regulate the fees of
the Clerk of the Circuit Court, by determining which class the
county falls within, under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
will take judicial notice of the population of the county by the
last census: Worcester Bank v. Cheeney (188o), 94 Ill. 430.
Finally, the Supreme Court of California broadly states the
rule that, "Every judge is bound to know the history and the
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leading traits which enter into the history of the country over
which he presides." The court takes judicial notice of all the
leading features and peculiar facts in the history of the State;
its physical development and :ocial condition, mainly growing
out of the fact that the United States Government has parted
with comparatively a small portion of the soil by sale to indi-
viduals; that, in consequence, the mining regions have become
public domain, the usages in regard to which have assumed
the character of matters of notoriety and history, to be re-
garded by the courts as having in many instances the force of
positive law: Conger v. Weaver (1856), 6 Cal. 548.
XX.
All courts of general jurisdiction take judicial notice of the
day of holding general elections, and of the officers to be
elected, under the Constitution and laws of their respective
States: State v. Minnick (1863), 15 Iowa 123; and of the re-
currence of the day on which the general election is held:
Hirnmelmann v. Hloadley (1872), 44 Cal. 213. And of the ac-
cession of a new governor: Hizerv. State (1859), 12 Ind. 330;
and of the civil officers of the county where such courts hold
their sittings: Dyer v. Flint (1859), 21 III. 80; Scott v. Jackson
(1857), 12 La. An. 640; Thielman v. BUrg (1874), 73 I1l. 293;
and of who are their own officers, but not those of other courts:
Norvell v. McHenry (1849), I Mich. 227. It has been held
.that, on the ground of general notoriety, the official character
of mustering officers, during the civil war, should be recognized
at least presumptively: C/hapman, &c., v. Herrold (I868), 58
Pa. io6.
Courts take judicial notice of accession of persons to, and
holding of, offices under the Constitution; and while remain-
ing in office and exercising official duties, they are regarded
by the courts as officers de facto: State ex rel. Knowlton v.
Williams (1856), 5 Wis. 308. Where the court has appointed
a sheriff, it will be- presumed to have acted upon judicial
knowledge of the vacancy. Doe on dem. of Saltonstall v.
Riley (1856), 28 Ala. 164.
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The Supreme Court of the United States takes judicial notice
of the persons who, from time to time, preside over the patent
office, whether permanently or temporarily, and the production
of their commissions is not necessary to support their official
acts: York, &c., R. R. Co. v. Winans (854), 17 How. (58 U.
S.) 30.
Courts take notice of the election or appointment of sheriffs,
as well as other administrative officers, and will treat them as
officers de facto, when the validity of their acts is collaterally
called in question: Thonpson v. Haskell(1859), 21 Ill. 215;
Alexander v. Burnham (1864), 8 Wis. 199. So of the sheriffs
of the several counties: Ingram v. State (1855), 27 Ala. 17;
the time at which a sheriff's office expired: Ragland v. Wynn
(186o), 37 Ala. 32; that a tax collector, duly appointed, is a
sheriff under a certain statute: Burnett v. Henderson (1858),
21 Tex. 588. For the purpose of sustaining the authenticity
of a certificate of acknowledgment of a power of attorney,
notice has been taken, that, under the Constitution of another
State, a county clerk is, ex officio, clerk of a court of record:
Morse v. He'witt (1874), 28 Mich. 481. Courts in Louisiana
take notice of military orders during the civil war, which
affected the proceedings of courts in portions of that State:
Lanfear v. Mestier (1866), 18 La. An. 497; Taylor v. Graham
(1866), 18 Id. 656; New Orleans Canal, &c., Co. v. Templeton
(1868), 20 Id. 141. Cognizance will be taken, that under the
constitution and laws of a State, the terms of all justices of the
peace terminate on a certain day: Stubbs v. State(I876), 53
Miss. 437; and in Indiana, of the legal times for the Boards of
County Commissioners to hold their sessions: Collins v. State
(1877), 58 Ind. 5 ; and that, by law, the trustee of the civil, is
also trustee of the school township: Inglis v. State (1878), 61
Ind. 212. Courts will know who are their own officers, and
supply the word "clerk," when omitted in a jurat: Dyerv. Last
(1869), 51 Ill. 179; and that a certain person is clerk, and that
it is his endorsement of the date of filing on a complaint: Yell
v. Lane (1883), 41 Ark. 53; Haminann v. Mink (1884), 99 Ind.
279. Notice will also be taken of the term of office of a notary
public, during which time he has authority to issue warrants-
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Carey v. State (1884), 76 Ala. 78. Where it appears to the
court, that by law in another State, a notary has authority to
do the act in question, his certificate and seal will be judicially
noticed: Denmead v. Maack (1876), 2 MacAr. (D. C.) 475.
XXI.
A certificate endorsed on a county treasurer's bond, by the
Deputy Auditor General, will be recognized as the act of a State
,officer: People v.Johr (1871), 22 Mich. 461. Where its clerk
signed a jurat as C. P. C. C., the court noticed the meaning of
these initials to be "Clerk Porter Circuit Court:" Buellv. State
(1880), 72 Ind. 523. Notice will be taken that a notary public,
who signs a jurat to an affidavit, holds his office within and for
the county where the same was made: Stoddardv. Sloan (1885),
65 Iowa 68o. Courts will take judicial notice of who fill the
county offices within their jurisdiction, and the genuineness of
their signatures; hence, it is not necessary to prove that one
who made a tax deed, was tax collector at the time the sale was
made: Wetherbee v. Dunn (I867), 32 Cal. io6; Templeton v.
-Morgan (1862), 16 La. An. 438.
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